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Abstract 
The management of waste from healthcare facilities can potentially pose a significant 
risk. In the UK, there are a number of increasingly stringent pieces of legislation and 
policies to mitigate against these risks. Using the taxonomy of organisational change 
(Vuuren, 1998), this study evaluated the inherent risks within the reported practices 
and policies of 21 Acute Care Trusts within the National Health Service (NHS) in 
London, England. The most frequently occurring exposures involved contact with 
sharps, infectious agents and hazardous substances and personal injuries during waste 
handling. Most of the reported exposures occurred within the wards and for this 
location, highly significant correlations were found between nurses and contact with 
sharps. The implications of these findings for risk management are also discussed. 
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1.Introduction 
The effective management of the infectious (clinical) fraction of healthcare waste 
(HCW) in the UK has increasingly gained attention over the last two decades, due to 
the need for compliance with increasingly stringent legislation and policies (Townend 
et al., 2009; Tudor et al., 2010; DH, 2011). HCW are the by-products of healthcare 
activities, comprised of: sharps, non-sharps, blood, human tissue, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices and radioactive materials (WHO, 2007). Clinical 
wastes are defined in the UK, in the Controlled Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2012, as: 
 
 Any waste which consists wholly or partly of human or animal tissue, blood or 
body fluids, excretions, drugs or other pharmaceutical products, swabs or 
dressings or syringes, needles or other sharp instruments, being waste which 
unless rendered safe may prove hazardous (including microbial (infectious, 
pharmacological and/or physical (e.g. sharps) dangers to any person coming 
into contact with it  
 Any other waste arising from medical, nursing, dental, veterinary, 
pharmaceutical or similar practice, investigation, treatment, care, teaching or 
research, or the collection of blood for transfusion being waste, which may 
cause infection to any person coming into contact with it  
 
The management of clinical waste can present significant physical, chemical and 
microbiological risks to those involved in the handling, treatment and disposal 
processes (Salkin, 2004; HPA, 2008; HSE, 2011a). Indeed, sharps accounted for some 
68% of all percutaneous injuries (HPA, 2008). However, while there has been much 
3 
 
work undertaken on clinical staff, there has been limited empirical research of 
ancillary staff (HSE, 2011a). Using a case study approach of the 21 Acute Care Trusts 
within the National Health Service (NHS) in London, England, this study aimed to 
examine the use of selected risk management tools for the management of waste from 
healthcare facilities. 
 
1.1The NHS 
The NHS is one of the largest organisations in the world, employing approximately 
1.7 million people, over half of whom are directly involved in healthcare service 
provision (NHS, 2014). The average number of days lost per worker due to injuries 
and illnesses in the health and social sector is amongst the highest across all sectors at 
1.78, compared to an average of 0.98 (HSE, 2013a). This translates into lost-time of 
approximately £1 billion per annum (HSE, 2010). At the time of the study, the 
healthcare services in London employed a workforce of over 200,000 employees 
(NHS, 2008). 
 
2.Risk management 
Of the 156,000 incidents reported between 2004 and 2005 under the Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR), only 61 
fell into the ‘reportable incidents’ category. This figure, however, does not reflect the 
‘numerous’ minor sharps injuries that occurred in the healthcare sector, which were 
either considered low risk or resulted in less than three days lost time (HSE, 2011b). 
In managing HCW, emphasis is placed on managing the intrinsic risks that HCW 
poses to the environment and the persons frequently exposed (DH, 2011). Studies 
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suggest that systems for managing the associated health and safety risks may be 
inadequate (HPA, 2008; HSE, 2011a; HM Treasury, 2013). 
 
In high-risk industries (e.g. chemical, nuclear and oil exploration), predictive tools 
and models have for some time been used to proactively manage risks, through for 
example hazard mapping (Reniers et al., 2005; Kennedy and Kirwan, 1998; Vuuren, 
1999). 
 
The OSH Framework Directive (1989), is the key EU Directive covering health and 
safety (EU, 2013). In addition, there are a number of individual directives which 
define how to assess risks and, in some instances set limit values for certain 
substances or agents. A series of EU directives based on Article 114 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 95 TEC) also relate to safety and 
health (EASHW, 2013). 
 
Implementation of the directives in the UK is through the Control of Major Accidents 
Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999. These regulations prescribe the principle of 
risk elimination and reduction to levels as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
(HSE, 1999). Specifically related to sharps waste are the Health and Safety (Sharps 
Instruments in Healthcare) Regulations 2013 (HSE, 2013b).  
 
2.1Risk management tools 
A taxonomy of organisational failure applied to clinical risk management found that 
the majority of the patient-safety incidents (45%) were caused by organisational and 
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management failures, while human factors, relating to incorrectly carrying out tasks, 
followed closely (Vuuren, 1999). 
 
Over the years, a variety of qualitative, quantitative, deterministic and probabilistic 
risk analysis techniques have been developed (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Tixier et al., 
2002; Vaurio, 2010). The most common of these include (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; 
Tixier et al., 2002): Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP); Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA); and Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA). The techniques are all aimed at 
forecasting and analysing the consequences of likely accidents, and emergency 
preparedness. FMEA and FTA have been applied in clinical settings as a means of 
achieving clinical governance in the area of error reduction, and improving patient 
safety (Paparella, 2007; Cagliano et al., 2011; Chiozza and Ponzetti, 2009). 
According to Paparella (2007), the use of FMEA allows for a proactive assessment of 
what things could go wrong in a system, and provides an opportunity to rectify the 
weak links before failures occur. FMEA and ETA are increasingly being considered 
outside of their traditional environments, including waste management (Pollard et al., 
2006). FMEA is a particularly appropriate technique for managing the hazards of 
HCW, due to its underpinning in the proactive, rather than reactive assessment of the 
risks (Cagliano et al., 2011). 
 
3.Methods 
Between June – August 2011 incidences of patient safety and HCW-related risks were 
obtained through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests submitted to the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE), the Department of Health (DH), the National Patient Safety 
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Advisory (NPSA), the HPA, and each of the 21 NHS Trusts. The effective response 
rate obtained was approximately 33%. 
 
The relevant types of data were established based on the taxonomy of organisational 
failure (Vuuren, 1999). However, the research utilised the historical data on patient 
safety-related risks to develop a failure taxonomy, which was thereafter tested against 
the data on the HCW-related risks. 
 
3.1 Incidences of Patient-Safety Related Risks 
In July 2011, FOI requests were sent to the DH and NSPA regarding incidences of 
medical error reported, for the period January 2009 to December 2009. 
 
3.2 Incidences of HCW-Related Risks 
In July 2011, FOI requests were sent to the DH, HSE, HPA, and each of the 21 NHS 
Acute Trusts regarding incidences of health and safety risks from HCW for the period 
January 2005 to December 2009. 
 
3.3 Review of Trust’ Health and Safety Policies 
The evaluation criteria for the review of the Health and Safety policies for each of the 
Trusts were based on (Pollard et al., 2006). To ensure consistency, the focus areas 
identified from each policy review was carried over to the next, and any new areas 
noted and included for subsequent reviews. Also, as the means of implementation was 
often not precisely stated, a list of the four most commonly observed implementation 
methods was subsequently employed. 
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3.4 Data Analyses 
The data were analysed using the Predictive Analysis Software (PASW) Statistics 
application using a range of descriptive and bivariate analyses. In categorising data, it 
is important to first identify the recurring regularities in the data and then decide what 
elements fit together (Patton, 2002). Therefore the analyses sought to determine and 
establish the relevant categories. This involved creating common themes by assigning 
codes to the various data elements, and grouping data sets to form themes. The 
thematic analysis of the incidences data was guided primarily by the questions that the 
FOI requests sought to answer (Stake, 1995). This approach resulted in the 
identification of four data categories: Incident types; Incident severity; Staff category; 
and Root causes. 
 
To identify patterns and trends, a coding scheme was developed, by assigning alpha 
numeric values to individual data elements, for use in reviewing the health and safety 
policies. This content analysis enabled the documents to be broken down into discreet 
parts for contextual examination in relation to the predefined, coded evaluation 
criterion.  
 
Triangulation was achieved by comparing and cross-checking the consistency of the 
analysed information on the incidences of HCW-related risks with that of the health 
and safety policies, based on (Patton, 2002). The results were generalised using 
analytic generalisation, rather than statistical analyses to establish a pattern-model 
theory between incidents and causes (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004). This 
comparison served to validate the applicability of the patient safety risk management 
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techniques in a HCW management context, on the basis of common classifications of 
causes of failures. 
 
4.Results 
Table 1 illustrates that there was a statistically significant relationship between Trust 
type and four key factors, namely: (1) contact with sharps (65.57, P <0.001); (2) 
infectious agents (58.69, P <0.001); (3) manual handling (51.09, P<0.001); and (4) 
being struck by or against an object (55.34, P <0.001). 
 
Table 1: The association between Trusts and exposure categories 
Categories of  
Exposure 
Pearson 
Chi Square 
Value 
Df 
Asymp. Sig 
(2-sided) 
Contact (Sharps) 65.57 6 0.000 
Contact (Infectious) 58.69 6 0.000 
Personal Injury 16.58 6 0.011 
Contact (Hazardous) 15.40 6 0.017 
Manual Handling 51.06 6 0.000 
Struck (Against or By) 55.34 6 0.000 
Slips, Trips & Falls 19.46 6 0.003 
 
4.1 Occupational Health and Safety Incidents 
There were seven key categories of health and safety hazards, comprised of contact 
with sharps (73.5%), contact with infectious agents (16.3%), personal injury (3%), 
contact with hazardous materials and manual handling (3% each), struck by an object 
(1%), and slip, trips and falls (0.2%). 
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Some 73.5% (225/306) of the occupational health and safety incidents relating to 
HCW resulted from contact with sharps, while 16.3% (50/306) were from contact 
with infectious agents. The remaining 10.2% (31/306) incidents collectively consisted 
of contact with hazardous materials, manual handling, and other hazards that resulted 
in ill-health and physical type injuries. Some 33% (101/306) of the incidents reported 
for the period originated from T6, followed by 31.7% (97/306) from T7, with the 
lowest incidence reported by T12, constituting just 2.6% (8/306). 
 
4.2: Incident Types and Points of Occurrence 
The majority of incidents occurred within the hospital wards, accounting for 67.4% 
(198/306) of the total. Approximately 76.5% (150/198) of these cases were through 
contact with sharps alone. The operating theatre and the Accident & Emergency 
(A&E) departments recorded 9.8% (30/306) and 8.8% (27/306) respectively, with 
exposure to sharps accounting for 30 incidents in total for both locations. There were 
only 1.3% (4/306) incidents recorded in non-clinical facilities within the hospitals and 
only 50% (2/4) of these were as a result of contact with sharps, while the other 50% 
involved manual handling. Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the relationships between 
department type and the type of exposure. Highly significant and strong positive 
relationships were observed between: wards and contact with sharps (r = 0.997, P 
<0.001); A&E/theatre and contact with hazardous agents (r = 0.897, P = 0.006/r = 
0.783, P = 0.037 respectively); A&E/theatre and personal injury (r = 0.828, P = 
0.022/r = 0.932, P = 0.002 respectively); and theatre and contact with infectious 
materials (r = 0.842, P = 0.017). 
 
10 
 
 
Figure 1: Incident types and locations of occurrence 
4.3: Patterns of Exposure 
The main occupational groups observed to be at risk of exposure included: nurses; 
doctors; and other healthcare professional such as midwives, auxiliary staff and 
laboratory personnel (Figure 2). Information on the occupational groups involved in 
47.1% (144/306) of the incidents was unavailable and these were categorised as 
unknown. The largest identifiable occupational group exposed to incidents were the 
nurses, constituting 31.4% (96/306), followed by cleaners at 7.5% (23/306), while 
other auxiliary personnel comprised 6.2% (19/306) of the total. There was a 
statistically significant and positive correlation between nurses and wards (r = 0.791, 
P = 0.034). 
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Figure 2: Exposure location and occupational groups 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that there were significant correlations between nursing staff and 
contact with sharps (r = 0.832, P = 0.020). There were also significant incidents of 
slips, trips and falls for maintenance staff (r = 0.944, P = 0.001). 
 
 
Figure 3: Exposure types and occupational groups 
 
4.4: Patterns of Harm 
The severity of lost-time was classified into four main categories, comprising: None; 
1-3 days; >3 days; and, Unknown (where the data were insufficient to establish the 
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appropriate lost-time severity category). The majority of exposures (69.3%; 212/306) 
resulted in no time-off from work, even though 72.2% (153/306) of these involved 
contact with sharps. The exposures that resulted in 1-3 days away from work 
constituted 18.6% (57/306), while those necessitating more than 3 days off amounted 
to only 1% (3/306). Insufficient data led to classifying the lost-time for 11.1% 
(34/360) of exposures, as unknown. Some 66.3% (203/306) of all exposures were 
considered ‘minor’, while 25.2% (77/306) resulted in no harm. Moderate harm 
constituted 5.9% (18/306), while major and extreme exposures were collectively 1% 
(3/306). The degree of harm for 1.6% (5/306) of the exposures was unknown. 
 
Approximately 25% of the exposures were classified as near-misses, resulting in no 
harm to the persons involved, with the vast majority of these occurring within the 
wards. Only one of the 306 (0.3%) was considered extreme although the exact nature 
of the exposure could not be established from the data. Insufficient data also saw the 
classification of five exposures within the wards into the ‘unknown degree of harm’ 
category. 
 
4.5: Causative Patterns 
Non-compliance was the highest cause of incidences with 51% of all exposures. Some 
90.4% of non-compliances were attributed to contact with sharps. Failure to use PPE 
occurred in only 2.3% (7/306) of the cases, while human error was blamed for 25.5%. 
 
4.6: Analysis of the Trusts’ Health and Safety Policies 
Only five Trusts (T6, T7, T9, T11 and T12), constituting 71.4% of the sample, had 
approved health and safety policies. The remaining 28.6% (T8 and T10) either had 
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none or were in the process of developing one. The policies were evaluated against a 
five-point criterion prescribed for the design and implementation of a health and 
safety policy (HSE, 2011a). Some 16 key areas of policy focus were cumulatively 
identified from the review of all the health and safety policy documents. These focus 
areas included: fire safety; hazardous substances; manual handling; infection control; 
equipment safety, radiation protection; working with display screens; workplace 
violence; slips, trips and falls; facility security; traffic management; contractor 
control; falling objects; lone work; terrorism; and, waste management. Only one of 
the seven Trusts (T7), specifically considered waste management within the scope of 
its health and safety policy. No statistically significant correlations were observed 
between the number of years of policy implementation (maturity continuum), the 
number of policy focus areas, and the number of HCW-related exposures (r =0.535, P 
= 0.216 and r = 0.176, P = 0.705, respectively). Similarly, no significant link was 
found regarding the availability of health and safety policies and the number of HCW-
related exposures. The significantly higher rank sums of the Trusts without health and 
safety policies indicated that policy availability did not have a strong effect on the 
frequency of exposures. 
 
Based on Vuuren (1999), the classification of exposure causes yielded 241 
organisational failure causes, comprised of attitudes to safety (67%; 163/241) and 
skills and knowledge (33%; 78/241). 
 
5.Discussion 
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5.1Occupational Exposure Patterns 
The most frequently occurring exposures involved contact with sharps and with 
infectious agents, and personal injuries during waste handling. Contact with sharps 
constituted approximately 73% of the reported exposures within the study population. 
This corresponded well with the findings of the HPA (2008), which noted that 76% of 
all related exposures between 2000 and 2007 involved percutaneous injuries. Salkin 
(2004) also found exposure to sharps to be the most frequently occurring risk from 
HCW. Even though slips, trips and falls were found to constitute less than 1% of 
incidents reported in this study, these factors are still a major cause for concern in the 
NHS, with respect to employee lost-time (HSE, 2011b). It is, however, noted that in 
the context of HCW management, slips, trips and falls did not feature as often as other 
forms of exposure. 
 
Approximately 65% of the reported exposures occurred within the wards and for this 
location, highly significant correlations were found between nurses (the occupational 
group most at risk of exposure) and contact with sharps. Although a significant 
number of the incident reports reviewed were lacking in the necessary details to 
establish the occupational groups involved, the fact that over half of these exposures 
occurred within the wards suggests they may likely have involved contact with sharps 
by nurses as well. The nursing profession has long been associated with the highest 
risks of exposure from HCW (HPA, 2008). The findings from the present study also 
suggest that cleaners and porters collectively account for approximately 11% of all 
exposures reported, which reflected a higher proportion than was observed previously 
(HPA, 2008). Without actual site visits, it was impossible to relate to the findings to 
practice. However, in this study, only 1.3% of exposures were reported to have 
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occurred around the general facilities, and these involved contact with sharps and 
manual handling. 
 
Despite the high frequency of contact with sharps, most exposures were noted to have 
caused no harm or just minor harm. Strong correlations were observed between 
contact with sharps and no lost time from work. It is impossible to state precisely 
what factors may have been responsible for these incidents, although the standard 
practice of vaccinating workers in similar environments against common blood-borne 
infections like hepatitis and tetanus could be a contributory factor (HSE, 2010). 
Exposure to infectious agents also registered as a concern worthy of note, because 
most of these exposures took the form of contact with sharps and inconsistencies in 
incident reporting made it difficult to exclude one exposure from the other. 
Nevertheless, the root cause of a vast majority of exposures to sharps and other 
infectious materials, involving frontline and ancillary staff, is a failure in the safe 
disposal of HCW by healthcare professionals. This study found that over 90% of all 
exposures resulted from failures to follow the Department of Health guidance ‘Safe 
Management of Healthcare Waste’ (DH, 2011), and were thus classifiable as being 
caused by non-compliance. Furthermore, about 25% of all exposures were reported as 
resulting in no harm, of which less than 2% of these lacked necessary details, 
indicating that higher exposure numbers could have been recorded. The featuring of 
these ‘no harm incidents’, however, suggests that opportunities exist for the incorrect 
practices to be corrected through near miss reporting. Regarding the causes of 
exposures, human error was the second most significant cause, occasioned by post-
procedure contact with sharps, perhaps in the course of recapping needles or as a 
consequence of non-compliance with the universal precautions. Indeed, NHS (2006) 
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stated that exposures, which occurred post-clinical procedure, but prior to disposal, 
accounted for approximately 50% of all needle-stick injuries either through collisions, 
during clearing up or whilst recapping. 
 
5.2Health and Safety Management Programmes 
As evidenced by the health and safety policy documents reviewed, over 70% of the 
Trusts sampled had approved policies. Only one had none, while another was unable 
to provide its, as the document was said to be undergoing review. Policy review is a 
salient aspect of health and safety management (HSE, 2011a), which could perhaps 
explain why this was the case with that Trust. However, it was noted as unusual that a 
Trust had no health and safety policy document, as this clearly translated into a breach 
of duty imposed under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act, 1974 s.2(3), which 
requires all employers of more than five persons to maintain health and safety 
policies. However, it was interesting to note that the Trust without a health and safety 
policy accounted for only 5% of the total exposures reported during the study, which 
suggests that there was perhaps no correlation between having a health and safety 
policy document and the frequency of exposures reported. Inversely, the Trust whose 
policy was undergoing review accounted for 16.3% of the total exposures. 
 
There were some significant, though weak correlations between the number of years 
Trusts’ health and safety policies had been in place and the number of exposures 
reported. Exposure rates decreased as the length of time the policies had been in place 
increased (i.e. there was an inverse relationship). It was interesting to note, that all the 
Trusts with health and safety policies, had clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
for key Trust personnel who would implement the policies. Policy implementation 
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strategies were also observed to vary, as did the focus areas and frequencies of 
exposure. In keeping with the minimum prescribed occupational health and safety 
service standard for the NHS (DH, 2001), all policies reviewed indicated that at least 
a safe system of work (consisting primarily of risk assessment and control), was 
implemented in combination with operating procedures in over 40% of the Trusts 
sampled. Ironically, those with the highest and lowest reported exposures were both 
observed to be implementing comprehensive occupational health and safety 
management systems. Similarly, of all those with policies, these two were also found 
to have the fewest number of policy focus areas, ranging between six and 10, as 
ranked on the interval scale. It must be emphasised at this point that the style or 
proficiency of occupational health and safety management, as expressed by a policy 
document, may not accurately reflect the actual practices, standards or organisational 
culture in practice. 
 
5.3Organisational Culture (Safety Attitudes) 
Almost all exposures involving contact with sharps, occurred as a result of a failure of 
the responsible person(s) to appropriately dispose of needles or instruments following 
clinical procedures. According to Salkin (2004), occupational exposures, which 
occurred after the procedure, are largely preventable through adequate compliance 
with the procedures for the safe handling and disposal of sharps and other HCW 
materials. 
 
5.4Organisational Structure (Skills and Knowledge) 
With regards to human error, the review of exposure report descriptions revealed a 
high incidence of exposures resulting from accidental contact with waste materials 
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due to distractions or wrongful judgement on the part of the healthcare worker. These 
findings, in the course of reviewing the Trusts’ exposure data were consistent with 
(HPA, 2008). An inherent problem in HCW management, as noted by Muhlich et al. 
(2003), is that of training staff such that there is no confusion when tasked with 
handling waste, to the extent of compromising occupational health and safety for 
themselves or others. Phillips (1999) stated that in practice, instructing diverse groups 
of hospital workers, involved in HCW management, of their responsibilities and safe 
practices often presented numerous challenges. The level of human error observed 
during this study could be attributed to similar challenges encountered by the Trusts 
sampled. 
 
5.5The Applicability of the Taxonomy 
The efficacy of using risk management tools to proactively manage safety critical 
operations, and for analysing the interrelationships between causative factors, has 
been demonstrated by various studies (Kennedy and Kirwan, Vuuren, 1999; Paparella, 
2007). 
Theoretically derived error taxonomies are more likely to be generic in applicability 
(Taib et al., 2011). With more in-depth information regarding the incidences of the 
exposures, the organisational root causes of failures could be further and more 
explicitly classified across the nine factors of the Vurren (1999) taxonomy. By 
considering the organisational and systemic perspectives of failures, the most critical 
aspects of a system can thus be identified (Stake, 1995). In a similar context, Cosby 
(2003) identifies teamwork failure as the major contributing factor in the majority of 
serious untoward events concerning clinical governance, and a focus area for risk 
management. Kennedy and Kirwan (1998) also found common ground with previous 
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researchers in the prioritisation of the sub-elements of the organisation (safety culture 
and safety management), for the detailed modelling of adverse events, in determining 
appropriate mitigation strategies. 
6.Conclusion 
Using 21 Acute Care NHS Trusts from London, as the case study, this study found 
that the most frequently occurring exposures involved contact with sharps, infectious 
agents and hazardous substances and personal injuries during waste handling. Most of 
these occurred within the wards, primarily involving nurses and contact with sharps. It 
is equally important to note the high percentage of ‘unknown’ HCW exposure causes 
that were excluded from the test in this study, which, with additional information, 
could have reflected an entirely different spread across the nine factors, and perhaps 
revealed details that may have necessitated the creation of some domain-specific 
organisational failure factors. In general, adverse events occur due to a combination of 
factors, of which those relating to the organisation were crucial, as they can 
significantly influence failure dynamics. The strategy for risk management varies 
according to the dynamics of underlying influences. Consequently, similarities in the 
causal factors of disparate events would suggest that comparable approaches to 
management may be adopted. Thus it can be argued that similarly to its application in 
other contexts (e.g. Paparella, 2007; Cagliano et al., 2011), risk analysis tools such as 
FMEA, Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and Clinical Risk Effect 
Analysis (CREA), can be successfully employed to mitigate against the health and 
safety risks associated with the management of HCW. 
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